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Abstract
A popular narrative about the history of modern biology has it that Ernst Mayr introduced the
distinction between “typological thinking” and “population thinking” to mark a contrast between
a metaphysically problematic and a promising foundation for (evolutionary) biology, respectively.
This narrative sometimes continues with the observation that, since the late-20th century, typo-
logical concepts have been making a comeback in biology, primarily in the context of evolution-
ary developmental biology. It is hard to square this narrative with the historical and philosophical
literature on the typology/population distinction from the last decade or so. The conclusion that
emerges from this literature is that the very distinction between typological thinking and popula-
tion thinking is apieceofmere rhetoric thatwas concoctedand rehearsed forpurely strategic, pro-
grammatic reasons. If this is right, it becomes hard to make sense of recent criticisms (and some-
times: espousals) of the purportedly typological underpinnings of certain contemporary research
programs. In this article, I offer away out of this apparent conflict. I show thatwe canmake histori-
cal and philosophical sense of the continued accusations of typological thinking by looking beyond
Mayr, to his contemporary and colleague George Gaylord Simpson. I show that before Mayr dis-
cussed the typology/population distinction as an issue in scientific metaphysics, Simpson intro-
duced it to mark several contrasts in methodology and scientific practice. I argue that Simpson's
insightful discussion offers useful resources for classifying and assessing contemporary attribu-
tions of typological thinking.
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Bauplan, body plans, Ernst Mayr, Essentialism Story, George Gaylord Simpson, morphological
type, phyla, typological thinking, typology
1 THE MAKING OF “TYPOLOGICAL
THINKING”
A popular narrative about an episode in the history of evolution-
ary biology from the mid-20th century to today runs as follows: In
the heyday of the modern evolutionary synthesis, Ernst Mayr (1904–
2005) coined the term “typological thinking” for a collection of mis-
guided metaphysical ideas and anti-evolutionary commitments that
were shared by many morphologists, anatomists, and paleontologists.
Their reliance on concepts of “body plans” and “morphological types”
suggested an ontology of idealistic, otherworldly forms—an ontology
for which there was no place in modern, Darwinian biology (Mayr,
1959). The alternative to this typological mode of thinking was the
“population thinking” of the modern synthesis: an ontology and out-
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in anymedium, provided
the original work is properly cited.
c© 2018 The Authors. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution published byWiley Periodicals, Inc.
look that eschewed postulating the existence of (supra)specific types
and that constrained the study of evolution to variants of genes, alle-
les, andgenotypes inpopulations and species. This narrative abouthow
typological thinking was supplanted by population thinking is some-
times continued with the observation that, since the home stretch of
the 20th century, there has been a gradual resurgence of talk about
body plans, morphological types, and phylotypic stages, primarily in
the context of evolutionary developmental biology (e.g., Amundson,
2005; Wagner, 2014). According to some, this resurgence of typolog-
ical language has been accompanied by an unwelcome return of what
remains at heart a static, antievolutionary, and hence “unbiological”
approach to biology. But others argue that it is high time for a reevalu-
ation of typological thinking, which may provide helpful and perhaps
even indispensable resources for the project of explaining the origin
J Exp Zool (Mol Dev Evol). 2018;330:123–131. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jezb 123
124 WITTEVEEN
of form. According to them, themodern synthesis has unduly sidelined
and marginalized fruitful scientific styles and approaches, by branding
all theorizing about “types” as mystical and unscientific.
Popular as this narrative may be, it has become problematic in
the light of the historical and philosophical literature on the typol-
ogy/population distinction from the last decade or so. The conclusion
that emerges from this literature is that the very distinction between
typological thinking and population thinking is a piece ofmere rhetoric
that was devised for strategic and programmatic purposes, primarily
by Mayr (Winsor, 2003; Levit et al., 2006). For example, historian of
biology Polly Winsor has argued that Mayr's attack on typological
thinking from the late 1950s onward was “an enormously effective bit
of polemic” meant to sideline critics of the modern synthesis “rather
than accurately describe the avowed position of anyone” (Winsor,
2006, p. 159). The same holds, according to Winsor, for Mayr's later
accusations of “essentialism,” a notion he tended to equate with
“typology” and “typological thinking.” Mayr thus successfully created
and disseminated a mythical “Essentialism Story” that portrayed
the history of biology as an ongoing clash between typologists and
population thinkers, culminating with the victory of the latter camp in
themodern synthesis (Winsor, 2003;Wilkins, 2009).
But if the notion of typological thinking that Mayr and others were
up against was indeed a fabrication, what should we make of recent
criticisms (and sometimes: espousals) of the purportedly typological
underpinnings of certain contemporary research programs? Accord-
ing to the revisionist historiography these revived claims of typology
must be idle and meaningless. For example, in a review of an edited
volume on recent developments in evo-devo, Rieppel (2008) observed
that although some practitioners of evo-devo “still feel haunted by the
neo-Darwinian charge of typological thinking… it is time to recognize
the charges of ‘typology’ and ‘typological thinking’ for what they are –
creatures of ‘the Essentialism Story’” (p. 506).
In this essay, I will argue that it is nevertheless worth salvaging a
notion of typological thinking from the scrapheaps of the Essentialism
Story. I will show that although Winsor and others were right about
the opacity of Mayr's accusations of typological thinking, they largely
overlooked that these had descended (with considerablemodification)
from an earlier, far more substantive critique of typological thinking
due to George Gaylord Simpson (1902–1984). In contrast with Mayr,
Simpson's discussions of typology were not focused on metaphysical
concerns, but instead issued from clearly articulated methodological
and conceptual matters in the taxonomic practice of his day. Recover-
ing Simpson's thoughts on typological thinking is important because it
can provide a bridge to contemporary discussions in which some of his
concerns continue to be echoed.
I will use Simpson's discussions to distinguish between three dif-
ferent “grades” of typological thinking that he took issue with, before
showing that attributions of each of these grades can also be discerned
in contemporary debates at the interface of paleontological systemat-
ics and evo-devo.1 I will argue that although these attributions of typo-
logical thinking are meaningful as such, they often miss their mark in
the contemporary context. Many of the errors of typological thinking
that Simpson identified back in his day no longer apply today.
2 TYPOLOGY THEN: SIMPSON ON
SYSTEMATICS
The origins of what would develop into the distinction between
typological and population thinking can be traced to 1937. In that year
Simpson wrote two articles on methods and principles of systematics
(Simpson, 1937a,b), and Theodosius Dobzhansky published his soon-
to-be-famous monograph Genetics and the Origin of Species (Dobzhan-
sky, 1937). In these publications, Simpson and Dobzhansky indepen-
dently began to criticize a notion of types and made a case for what
they characterized as a population-based approach. However, since
these twomenwereconcernedwithdifferentnotionsof types that fea-
tured in different contexts, they ended up articulating different kinds
of type/population distinctions. Starting in the 1950s, Mayr began
to interweave these distinct type/population contrasts into a single,
overarching dichotomy. Elsewhere, I have argued that whatMayr took
to be a successful attempt at integration resulted in the confounding of
importantly different issues (Witteveen, 2015, 2016a). In his insistence
that the typology/population distinctionwas all about themetaphysics
of biology, Mayr obfuscated the various practical, methodological and
theoretical concerns that had been at the center of Simpson's and
Dobzhansky's original discussions of type concepts in biology (Mayr,
1959, 1982). I will not here recapitulate this complex account of the
transformation and popularization of the typology/population distinc-
tion by Mayr. Instead, I will discuss a particular strand of this history
that originated with Simpson. I will argue that Simpson's writings on
types and typology can be used to shed light on the meaning and force
of several contemporary attributions of typological thinking.
The two 1937 articles that inaugurated Simpson's concern with
things typological were “Patterns of Phyletic Evolution” (Simpson,
1937a) and “Supra-specific variation in nature and in classification
from the viewpoint of paleontology” (Simpson, 1937b). Although
Simpson did not use the term “type” or any of its derivatives in either
of these articles, it is clear that they started orienting him toward a cri-
tique of methods and principles that he would later associate with a
notion of types. When Simpson reflected on the first of these two arti-
cles toward the end of his scientific career, he reminisced that it had
marked the “abandonment of typological thinking of my college teach-
ers and started aiming me toward statistical biometry and the deeper
investigation of evolutionary theory and taxonomic stance” (Simpson,
1978, p. 112). What was this “typological thinking” that Simpson had
abandoned?
A closer look at the “Patterns” article reveals a discussion of an
approach to classification based on methods, rules, and standards
that Simpson considered to be outdated scientifically. As an example
of this approach Simpson mentioned a classificatory rule he had
been taught in graduate school: “If one specimen is as much as 15
percent larger than another in any linear dimension, it is safe enough
to assume that they belong to different species” (Simpson, 1937a, p.
307). Simpson noted that, in practice, every taxonomist recognized
that thiswasmerely a rule of thumb: in some cases it could be perfectly
valid to assign two specimens to the same species if they differed by
more than 15%, in other cases a sound taxonomic judgment assigned
WITTEVEEN 125
specimens to different species even if they differed by much less than
15%. However, Simpson argued that even this looser interpretation
of the “15 percent rule” as a first-pass heuristic was problematic,
because of the more general practice of grouping organisms into
species that it was associated with. Taxonomists tended to attribute
new specimens to one or the other species by comparing them in a
one-by-one fashion with representative specimens of several known
species and by judging which of these representatives it resembled
most. Simpson objected that this practice of classification meant that
valuable information about the range of variation within species was
ignored. This may have once been necessary, but it was no longer
excusable now that sophisticated methods of inferential statistics
were available. Using these statistical techniques, taxonomists could
now compare entire samples of specimens, instead of relying on
individual specimens that stood in for their groups.
Simpsongaveexamplesof how inferential statistics couldbeapplied
to taxonomy in two other publications from the same year (Simpson,
1937c,d), as he started coauthoring a monograph on statistical meth-
ods in zoology with his partner Anne Roe (Simpson & Roe, 1939). In
thismonograph, Simpson and Roe for the first time addressed the rela-
tion between the method of one-by-one comparison and a notion of
“types.” Having observed that many taxonomists took so-called “type
specimens” to be key to the practice of one-by-one comparison, they
pointed out that this use of type specimens as standards of compar-
ison amounted to a double error. It compounded the use of a statis-
tically deficient method of classification with a flawed understand-
ing of the one and only role that type specimens should serve in
taxonomy.
The modern notion of a type specimen was not that of a typical
exemplar that could function as a standard of comparison, but instead
referred to the unique name-bearing specimen of a species. In the act
of describing a new species, it had become common practice to select
one specimen as the permanent anchor for the new species name.
This use of fixed specimens as anchors for species names enabled any
two taxonomists to agree about which hypothesized species circum-
scription should be associated with which species name, even if they
disagreed about whether the circumscription correctly identified the
boundaries of the named species.1 However, this use of type speci-
mens implied that they could not be used as representative exemplars
of their species’ typical traits. Even if a specimen had seemed repre-
sentative of a species at the time it was selected as that species’ name-
bearer, it could easily stop being representative after a revision of the
species’ hypothesized circumscription. For purposes of classification, a
type specimen was on a par with any other specimen. For purposes of
naming, knowingwhich type specimenwas part of which hypothesized
circumscription was essential.
Simpson neatly summarized this lesson about the proper use of
name-bearing types into an explicit contrast between types and pop-
ulations. He pointed out that modern taxonomic practice should be
“based on inferences about populations from samples, a view that
is rapidly gaining ground and to which I strongly adhere, is deci-
sively incompatible with this use of types [as standards of com-
parison]” (Simpson, 1940; reprinted in Simpson, 1981). It is worth
noting the methodological and eminently practice-oriented nature
of this type/population distinction—a far cry from the metaphysical
dichotomy thatMayr would popularize years later.
Simpson's concerns with types did not end here. In the second
important article from 1937, he laid the groundwork for a closely
related discussion of types that will be of primary interest to us (Simp-
son, 1937b). The aim of this article was to assess and elaborate on a
series of principles and methods for the classification of higher taxa
that had recently been outlined by the entomologist Alfred Kinsey
(1936). One principle from Kinsey that Simpson highlighted was the
idea that higher taxa should not be delimited by searching for unique
sets of characters common to a group of organisms. A higher taxonwas
to be defined “not by a fixed set of characters at any given point in time
but by the transmutation of its characters throughout its history, a fluid
character embracing the group as a whole and always distinctive from
any similar related group” (ibid., p. 255).
Taken at face value, these observations about supra-specific classi-
ficationmay seemunrelated to Simpson'swritings on themethodology
of classification at the species level, or to the notion of types he dis-
cussed in that context. But in subsequent writings Simpsonmade clear
that these two discussions were closely related after all. He noted that
his main criticism of the “characters-in-common approach” to higher
classification was essentially the same as his objection to the use of
classificatory types at the species level. In both contexts, he was tak-
ing issue with the appointment of standards of comparison that sup-
posedly picked out the typical or representative features of a group,
and that could be used to pass judgment on what else belonged in the
group. Simpson argued that by following this practice of classification,
taxonomists were effectively confusing diagnosis, the task of giving “a
statement of the difference between adjacent groups,” with definition,
the task of providing “a description of the characters and limits of vari-
ation of a single group” (Simpson, 1943 p. 152). Simpson emphasized
that the latter task was evidently epistemically prior to the former—
a good estimate of a group's boundaries was needed before (fallible)
diagnostic characters could be selected to tell groups apart. Yet many
taxonomistswere putting the cart before the horse. They helped them-
selves to purportedly diagnostic characters and then used these to
hypothesize about taxon limits.
In formulating an alternative approach to determining the limits of
higher taxa, Simpson gave further substance to the connectionwith his
type/populationdistinction at the species level.He repeatedly stressed
that the use of classificatory rules-of-thumb at any taxonomic level
impeded a proper consideration of the spectrumof variation and could
therefore result in flawed classifications. He sometimes characterized
the inflexible classificatory standards as “archetypal” or “typological”
models, incapable of representing the variational nature of taxonomic
groups (Simpson, 1941, 1945, 1951). Modern taxonomy, he argued,
should instead be “statistical in the broad sense,” by which he meant
that it should be rooted in “(a) estimating the characteristics of popula-
tions from samples; and (b) describing groups, as such, rather than indi-
viduals taken singly” (Simpson, 1943, p. 151). This two-pronged char-
acterization of statistics is noteworthy. It illustrates that Simpson was
not merely advocating the use of mathematical methods and the use
of larger quantities of numerical data—he emphasized that “good taxo-
nomic work can be and is being done without them” (ibid., p. 151)—but
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that, instead, he wanted to drive home that all inferences to the limits
of taxonomic groups should be rooted in a conception of those groups
as intrinsically variational units.
3 THREE GRADES OF TYPOLOGICAL
THINKING
We have seen that the picture of typological thinking that emerges
from Simpson's two 1937 articles and their follow-ups is that of an
approach to biological systematics with problematic methodological
and conceptual dimensions. In advocating population-based over type-
based approaches to classification, Simpson combined a plea for the
use of novel statistical methods with the subtler conceptual point that
conventional approaches had ledmany a taxonomist to confuse the job
of defining (i.e., determining the limits of) taxa with that of diagnosing
them (i.e. telling taxa apart).
But Simpson did not stop here. In subsequent writings, he pointed
out that what we might call this conceptual-methodological mode of
typological thinking could serve as a platform for sliding into other,
more pernicious forms of typological thinking. We can distinguish two
other “grades” of typological thinking that Simpson discussed: logical
typological thinking and theoretical-empirical typological thinking.
The lapse from conceptual-methodological into logical typological
thinking is demonstrated in Simpson's discussion of taxonomic ranks.
If one had already failed to distinguish properly between diagnosis and
definition (i.e., by taking sets of characters-in-common tobedefining of
taxa), one would be but a small step away from thinking that different
kinds of characters could be defining of taxa at different ranks. How-
ever, Simpson pointed out, this way of thinking about taxonomic ranks
wasobviously flawed.Acharacter that is diagnostic of, say, a subspecies
at one point in time can easily become diagnostic of a species if the
original group is turned into a species by isolation, and it can become
diagnostic of a newgenus after further divergence. “It is inevitable that
diagnostic characters should thus appear as individual variations and
tend gradually to become subspecific, specific, then generic characters,
and that no particular kind of character should be characteristic of a
particular taxonomic level” (ibid., p. 157).
The error of viewing certain characters as strictly rank-definingwas
part and parcel of an erroneous view about the nature of higher taxa
that wemight characterize as logical typological thinking: the idea that
the Linnaean taxonomic hierarchy as such evolves, with taxa of higher
rank “splitting” into taxa of lower rank in the course of time. Simpson
pointed out that this view about the “top-down” evolution of taxa was
evidently flawed. By taxonomic necessity, any organism (dead or alive)
must belong to some taxon at allmain ranks. In the Linnaean system of
classification, no organism can belong to a family without also belong-
ing to a genus and species within that family. It was wrong to think of
the Linnaeanhierarchy itself as a product of evolution (Simpson, 1943).
Andyet, it appeared toSimpson that contemporaries likeRichardGold-
schmidt, Otto Schindewolf, and John Willis were making exactly this
error. The adoption of logical typological thinking was perhaps best
illustrated by Goldschmidt, whowrote:
A phylum consists of a number of classes all of which are
basically recognizable as belonging to the phylum but, in
addition, are different from each other. The same principle is
repeated at each taxonomic level. All the genera of a family
have in common the traits which characterize the family; e.g.,
all genera of penguins are penguins. But among themselves
they differ from genus to genus. So it goes on down to the
level of the species. Can this mean anything but that the
type of the phylumwas evolved first and later separated into
the types of the classes, then into orders, and so on down
the line? This natural, naive interpretation of the existing
hierarchy of forms actually agrees with the historical facts
furnished by paleontology… Thus logic as well as historical
fact tells us that the big categories existed first, and that in
time they split in the form of the genealogical tree into lower
and still lower categories. (Goldschmidt, 1952, pp. 91–92)
Willis similarly claimed that “evolutiongoeson inwhatmaybecalled
the downward direction from family to variety” (Willis, 1940, p. 191). It
was in passages like these that Simpson saw evidence for how the rel-
atively innocuous characters-in-common approach to delimiting taxa
could lead to seriouslymistaken inferences about the logic of Linnaean
group-within-group classification (Simpson, 1953).
Committing the error of logical typological thinking in its turnmade
it easy to fall into the further trap of what we might call theoretical-
empirical typological thinking. Thequotation fromGoldschmidt already
hints at this third grade of typological thinking: the error of think-
ing that the evolutionary process must be saltational in nature. Simp-
son indeed suggested that many saltationist ideas about evolution had
been induced by, and were ultimately grounded in, a flawed concep-
tion of themethods and principles of classification. Thosewho thought
of higher taxa as sharing certain rank-defining characters were natu-
rally attracted by the idea that new taxa of descending rank must orig-
inate in a stepwise fashion. A qualitatively new rank-defining charac-
ter would need to emerge for such a step to be taken. Again, Simpson
pointed out that Goldschmidt, Schindewolf, andWillis claimed exactly
this in their writings on the origins of higher taxa. And again, Gold-
schmidt was the exemplar: “the conclusion is reached, on the basis of
the facts of development, comparative morphology, paleontology, and
the features of major adaptations, that the higher categories are built
up not by slow accumulation of micromutations selected for differ-
ent environments but by large initial macromutations which at once,
by affecting early embryological processes, produce the major basic
features of the new group, [which] afterwards may be improved, per-
fected, and diversified” (Goldschmidt, 1952, p. 93).
4 TYPOLOGY NOW: BODY PLANS AND
THE ORIGIN OF PHYLA
With the three grades of Simpson's critique of typological thinking on
the table, I will now consider whether and in what sense these attri-
butions of typological thinking recur in contemporary debates, and
weigh in on whether they are justified in the contemporary context.
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I do this with respect to a particular ongoing debate at the interface
of paleontological taxonomy and evo-devo: the debate over the clas-
sification and evolution of phyla. I will argue that although the accusa-
tions of typological thinking thatweencounter in this context are often
remarkably similar to those that Simpson made, it is far from clear
that these accusations hit their mark with regard to current scientific
practice.
Let us start by looking at recent variants of Simpson's conceptual-
methodological criticism, concerning the use of characters-in-common
as a means to delimit higher taxa. Several contemporary authors have
voiced similar criticisms when commenting on the relation between
the notion of body plan (or Bauplan) and the assignment of phylum-
level Linnaean ranks. For example, Scholtz (2004) has argued that the
notion of a body plan reveals it typological heritage as “an abstrac-
tion of commonality of characters” that is defining of a phylum-level
lineage (also see Fitch & Sudhaus, 2002). Jenner (2006) has simi-
larly claimed that talk of body plans and phyla in the context of evo-
devo “is characterized by a remarkable degree of typological think-
ing” because it “treats taxa as classes.” These claims resonate with
Simpson's point about the confusions between definition and diag-
nosis: one should not mistake diagnostically useful morphological
patterns for being defining features of higher taxa.
However, it is hard to find clear examples of this error in actual con-
temporary treatments of the relation between body plans and phyla.
For a start, phyla are first and foremost defined as cladistically inferred
higher-level communities of descent, with body plan criteria serving as
secondarymeans to pick out relevantly similar groups. Freeman (2014)
highlights this dual nature by offering a “two part definition” of a phy-
lum as “(a) a higher order community of descent, and (b) the extant and
fossil species that share the same body plan” (p. 221). Similarly, Arthur
(2000) remarks that “it is true, of course, that the concept of a body
plan is a ‘grade’ or ‘type’ issue; but it is that as well as, not instead of,
a clade issue” (p. 30). In addition, it is worth noting that the contempo-
rary notion of a phylum-level body plan tends not be conceived of as a
set of characters shared by all members of a group. For example, in his
important monograph On the Origin of Phyla (2004), James Valentine
argues that a body plan should be conceived of polythetically, that is,
as “anassemblageofmorphological features sharedamongmanymem-
bers of a phylum-level group. Not all of the features that characterize
a given architecture need be present in every member of the phylum,
however, and many of the features may be found in other phyla; it is
the assemblage of numbers of these features that is unique” (p. 33).
A similar conception of body plans emerges from other recent discus-
sions (e.g. Arthur, 2000;Collins&Valentine, 2001;Wray&Strathmann,
2002; Angelini & Kaufman, 2005).
Conceiving of body plans as assemblages does involve an element
of subjectivity in their identification and delimitation, but as several
authors have pointed out, this element of subjectivity should not be
a ground for consigning the notion of a body plan to the waste bin of
typological thinking (Valentine, 2004; Kemp, 2015). First, the subjec-
tive element inherent to Linnaean classification was of course already
present in Simpson's own evolutionary taxonomy (Simpson, 1961; Nel-
son, 2016). Moreover, there are reasons for thinking that the applica-
tion of the notion of a body plan to the phylum-level keeps the degree
of subjectivity or arbitrariness in check. The phylum-level rank within
the Linnaean hierarchy is often characterized as the highest level at
which we encounter morphological gaps between groups that are suf-
ficiently distinct to be recognizable bydistinct sets of salient diagnostic
characters, without being able to tell how those groups are related to
each other. Phyla thus stand apart from other ranks in expressing “an
admission of ignorance” regarding further higher-level relationships
between phylum-level taxa (Telford, Budd, & Philippe, 2015, p. R877).
Or, as Valentine (2004) has put it, the phylum-level is the level at which
we find the clearest separation of distinct “morphological themes” that
render the phylum-level one at which we can discern “quasi-natural”
groupings (pp. 31–32).
Recent findings in evo-devo reinforce this view of phyla as quasi-
natural groupings. Michal Levin and colleagues have shown that there
is high conservation of gene expression at the mid-developmental
stage among species that are typically classified within the same
phylum, versus high divergence between species of different phyla.
This suggests that the “phylotypic” stage indeed carves at the joints
between morphologically delimited phyla (Levin et al, 2016; cf. Hejnol
& Dunn, 2016). Another, more prominent approach to providing a
quasi-naturalistic interpretation of phyla can be found in the work of
Eric Davidson and Douglas Erwin, who have suggested that the sta-
ble persistence of different kernel circuits in gene regulatory networks
correlates with phylum-level classification (Davidson & Erwin, 2006).
Notice that these are not typological proposals of the sort that Scholtz
(2004) or Fitch and Sudhaus (2002) object to: they do not hark back
to a developmental definition of body plans as the basis for identifying
phyla. Instead, they suggest an independent developmental underpin-
ning of ranked groups that can be (loosely) “grafted” on an evolutionary
tree inferred from extensive molecular data.
Moving on to the second, logical dimension of typological think-
ing, we also find contemporary instances of attributions of this grade
of typological thinking. As I noted in the previous section, Simpson
pointed to this error when describing how the misleading notion of
rank-specific characters could induce the mistaken idea that higher
taxa evolved before lower ones. In the contemporary literature, we
encounter discussions of this grade of typological thinking with a sur-
prising twist. Although contemporary commentators agree that the
idea of rank-specific characters is mistaken, some have argued that
a rejection of rank-specificity should lead us to accept the idea that
higher taxa evolved before lower ones. What is more, it has been
argued that a rejection of the “top-down” view of evolution itself
amounts to a typological thinking!
To come to grips with this seemingly inverted attribution log-
ical typological thinking, let us zoom in on the debate in which it
surfaced—the debate over the question “Why are all phyla old?”. Raff
(1996) and Valentine (1995) raised this question in their search for an
explanation of why themajority of animal phyla have their origin in the
Late Cambrian. Fitch and Sudhaus (2002) and West-Eberhard (2003)
responded that the question is ill-posed. In linewith Simpson on logical
typological thinking, Fitch and Sudhaus argued that the “Why are
all phyla old?”-question proceeds from the false presupposition that
phyla have rank-defining characters, which, once they have emerged,
constitute the origin of a new phylum. According to them, this is at
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odds with how we should think of Linnaean ranks in a phylogenetic
context, because “the different hierarchical levels of the taxonomic
system (Phylum, Class, Order, etc.) are applied arbitrarily. These taxo-
nomic levels reflect relative divergence points in time… not particular
differences in Bauplan. That is, the groups-within-groups hierarchy of
taxonomy simply derives from common ancestry at more and more
ancient times. Phylum divisions represent divergences that occurred
earlier than Class or Order divisions within the Phylum, regardless of
the grade of difference in Bauplan” (Fitch and Sudhaus, 2002, p. 244;
italics in original). Thus, even if an indisputably novel architecture had
evolved recently, it would not be ranked as a new phylum-level body
plan because of its recency. Fitch and Sudhaus conclude that “‘all phyla
are old’ simply because of the hierarchical restrictions of taxonomy,
not because fundamental key changes to body plans have not arisen
more recently” (ibid., p. 244). West-Eberhard arrived at a similar
conclusion: “By force of phylogenetic taxonomy, systema naturae, all
phyla are old” (West-Eberhard, 2003, p. 615).
At first glance, these claims are suggestive of a top-down view of
classification: taxa of higher rank evolved before taxa of lower rank
originated. To understand how contemporary authors could have
reached this opposite conclusion compared to Simpson, we need
to realize that they approach classification from a present-oriented
cladistic point of view. This view is in principle compatible with the
view that at any earlier time horizon any given organism can be posi-
tioned in a taxon at all main levels of the Linnaean hierarchy. However,
if we recast the position of Fitch and Sudhaus in these terms, the
question “Why are all phyla old?” resurfaces as a live empirical issue.
If the number of thirty-five or so animal phyla that are recognized
today has remained stable since the Late Cambrian, this raises the
question why such a large share of extant phyla arose during a short
period and why so few have seen the light of day since. We know
from quantitative studies of disparity that the range of surviving phyla
is unlikely to be explained by the extinction of intermediate forms
(Foote, 1997; Erwin, 2007) and that the sudden appearance of phyla
is possibly related to the origin of distinctive regional patterning
mechanisms (Davidson & Erwin, 2006). All this is compatible with the
view that phylogenetic depth should play a restricting role in whether
or not we assign phylum-level rank. One can legitimately ask why
all phyla are old while acknowledging that geologically very recent
changes in developmental architectures would never be construed
as inaugurating a new phylum-level lineage. Thus, we can conclude
that the “Why are all phyla old?” question should not be denounced
for being typological, since it does not rest on a misconception
about the relation between evolution and the Linnaean hierarchy.
If anything, the critics of this question are mistaken in thinking
that that recency of ancestry must be the sole basis for Linnaean
classification.
Perhaps we can find a closer analogue of Simpson's criticism of
logical typological thinking in the writings of Graham Budd and col-
leagues. Starting in the late 1990s, Budd has argued that an implicit
tendency to associate phyla with rank-defining, phylum-level charac-
ters, has prompted “a logical flaw in attempts to talk about ‘phylum
level evolution’” (Budd, 1999, p. 328). Budd sees this logical flawmani-
fested in presentations of evolution as a top-down process:
If the taxonomic hierarchy truly reflected a “top-down” pat-
tern of evolution, so that “body plans” were suddenly gener-
ated, one would be entitled to ask what sorts of animals were
being thus generated. If a proto-mollusk suddenly emerged,
one might want to inquire as to what the details of its mor-
phology were – where it had sensory papillae or a shell, what
shape its gills were, and so on. In this scenario, there could be
no answer to these questions, because these would be ‘order’
or ‘family’ features, yet to emerge. (Budd, 1999, p. 328; also
see Budd, 2013 and Budd & Jensen, 2000)
An error of this sort indeed appears to crop up in writings from the
1980s and 90s that Budd is concerned with, such as Valentine's big
picture sketch of the Cambrian explosion: “Nearly all phyla appear in
the Early Cambrian, body plans already in place so far as can be told,
and then radiate into numbers of classes, and these into orders, so that
the diversity peak of each lower taxonomic rank is shifted towards
the present” (Valentine, 1994, p. 6751; also see Erwin, Valentine, &
Sepkoski Jr, 1987 andValentine, 1994). However, it would again be too
rash to conclude from assertions like these that their authors are have
committed a logical error. There are good reasons for thinking that the
appearance of error is due to brevity of expression. Valentine could be
read as saying that currently diagnostic features of many phyla (e.g.,
the radial symmetry and water vascular system of the Echinodermata;
the segmented body, exoskeleton, and joint appendages of the Arthro-
poda) were already present by the early Cambrian and that features
currently diagnostic of taxa of lower rank appear later in the fossil
record. This hypothesis about the “top-down” hierarchical nature of
the origin of currently diagnostic features is perfectly compatible with
holding that organisms that predated the evolution of those diagnostic
features did belong to taxa at all main ranks. The reason why little has
been said about the features of lower taxa is purely is epistemic: the
resolution of the fossil record is too low to identify diagnostic criteria
for extinct taxa at those ranks.
More recent work by Valentine suggests that something like this is
what he meant all along. In On the Origin of Phyla (2004) he observes
that, on the one hand, “the [fossil] record makes it appear that phyla
evolved first; then classes evolved,… then orders evolved,… and so
on,” but, on the other hand, he notes that “what might be expected
during the origin of phyla…would be the divergences of two lineages
from common ancestors, at first at the species level only. Then as time
passed their differences would becomemore pronounced, the two lin-
eages becoming as distinctive as are average genera, and then as are
average families, then as orders, and so forth” (Valentine, 2004, p. 444).
Valentine does not question the latter view. Therefore, the appearance
of a top-down formation of ranks must be just that: apparent, not real.
It is an artifact of an incomplete fossil record, which hides from our
view a buildup of morphological differences that preceded the assem-
bly of body plans as we know them.
Finally, let us turn to the third, theoretical-empirical error of typo-
logical thinking, according to which new taxa originate by saltation.
Once again, the writings of Budd and colleagues contain attributions
of this error, in close connection with the attributions of the logi-
cal error we just evaluated. Much like Simpson, Budd argues that an
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“over-reliance on the taxonomic hierarchy as a guide to evolution” has
been responsible for the development of “neo-Goldschmidtian” mod-
els of the origination of taxa at the species level and above (Budd and
Jensen, 1999, p. 327; also see Budd, 2006). For examples of these mis-
taken inferences from taxonomy to evolution Budd points to Arthur
(2000), who speculated that systemicmutations and hopeful monsters
could have played a role in the origin of body plans, and to Gellon and
McGinnis (1998),who suggested that theoriginof phylamayhavebeen
due to the sudden evolution of distinctiveHox gene suites.
Regardless of the merits of these saltationist hypotheses, it is
not evident that they were triggered by mistaken ideas about the
taxonomic hierarchy. Budd provides no direct support for his claim
that the authors he cites actually made an error of logical typological
thinking. He does, however, argue more generally that among paleon-
tologists and evolutionary-developmental biologists the “perception
of systematics exerts a profound influence on evolution” in ways that
hamper theorizing about the evolution of phyla (Budd, 2001, p. 487).
The biased perception he is referring to consists in the failure to
recognize the distinction between “crown groups” and “stem groups”
of phyla.2
A phylum's crown group of is the group comprising all descendants
of the common ancestor of the living members the phylum. Its stem
group is composed of all extinct species that close the gap between
the origin of the phylum and the origin of the crown group. Budd and
Jensen (2000) argued that the failure to distinguish between crown
groups and stem groups has constituted a “typological hindrance”
toward our understanding of the origins of phyla. An impoverished
conceptual repertoire has led many researchers to believe that “the
essential features of body plans are forced suddenly to accumulate at
the base of the new group, giving an emphasis to saltational notions
of evolution” (Budd, 1999). Instead, the crown/stem group distinction
allows that body plan features of phyla could have been assembled
gradually along the stem groups. On this view, the phylum originates
at the base of the crown group and its body plan becomes defined as
the set of features that is plesiomorphically shared by all members of
the crown group.
Although it is questionable whether failing to theorize in terms
of stem and crown groups has indeed caused researchers to adopt
saltationist views, it is evident that the renewed emphasis on the
crown/stemgroupdistinctionhas provenhelpful in the subsequent dis-
cussions of the origins of phyla (Brysse, 2008).3 Even so, not everyone
has agreed with how Budd and colleagues deploy this distinction to
define phyla as crown groups. Briggs and Fortey (2005) andCollins and
Valentine (2001) in particular have argued out that although Budd's
crown group definition of phyla helpfully renders their delimitation a
(cladistically) objective matter, this definition is ill-suited for theoriz-
ing about the evolution of phyla. First, because it has the odd conse-
quence of excluding the possibility of extinct taxa by definitional fiat.
This is obviously undesirable from a paleontological perspective. Sec-
ond, because restricting the definition of a phylum to the crown-group
entails that some species do not belong to a phylum at all, which gets
us back to the same issues aswe encountered in the discussion of Fitch
and Sudhaus (2002). Finally, perhaps the most worrisome feature of
the crown-group definition of phyla is that the circumscription of a
phylum and the identification of its body plan can become critically
affected by chance survival of a marginal primitive species. If a species
that is distantly related to other extant species in a crown-based phy-
lum goes extinct, this will radically change the time of origin of the phy-
lum and may lead to the exclusion of many fossil species that now fall
in the stem group. It seems odd to allow for a relative minor historical
event to have such major implications: “There seems something very
arbitrary about defining a major group on a whim of history” (Briggs &
Fortey, 2005, p. 99).
The debate about how the crown/stem group distinction should
be related to the definition and delimitation of phyla continues, with
different conceptionsof phyla beingpreferredbydifferent researchers
(e.g., see Budd, 2013; Erwin & Valentine, 2013). However, with the
crown-stem group distinction as such being on everyone's radar, the
debate has advanced beyond the point where one could legitimately
claim that certain researchers commit a fallacy of logical typological
thinking. Continued assertions to this effect stand in the way of
advancing genuine debates about the empirical and methodological
constraints on what the study of development can tell us about
macroevolution.
5 CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that the exposure and rejection of the Essentialism Story
should not lead us to reject all attributions of typological thinking as
meaningless or misguided. We can discern at least three meaningful
“grades” of typological thinking that were implicit in Simpson's dis-
cussions of systematics before the image of typological thinking hard-
ened into that of ametaphysical, Platonist doctrine underMayr's influ-
ence. I have argued that attributions of these three grades of typo-
logical thinking—conceptual-methodological, logical, and theoretical-
empirical—continue to feature in current debates about thenature and
origins of phyla and phylum-level body plans. However, while these
attributions of typological thinking are meaningful as such, it is not
always clear that they represent their contemporary targets accu-
rately. The case Simpson made for several grades of typological think-
ing in his day does not transfer to today.
ENDNOTES
1 This focus on recovering a forgotten original dimension of the typol-
ogy/population distinction differentiates my approach from other
reformist analyses of the typology/population distinctions, for example in
application to the difference between character and character-state evo-
lution (Brigandt, 2007) or as involving different strategies of idealization
and periodization (DiTeresi, 2010; Love, 2009).
2 See Dubois (2005) andWitteveen (2016b) for details on this nomenclatu-
ral “typemethod.”
3 The distinction was first proposed by Hennig (1969) and was developed
(and given its current name) by Jefferies (1979).
ORCID
Joeri Witteveen http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1291-9156
130 WITTEVEEN
REFERENCES
Amundson, R. (2005). The changing role of the embryo in evolutionary thought:
Roots of evo-devo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Angelini, D. R., & Kaufman, T. C. (2005). Comparative developmental genet-
ics and the evolution ofArthropodbodyplans.Annual Review ofGenetics,
39(1), 95–119.
Arthur, W. (2000). The origin of animal body plans. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Brigandt, I. (2007). Typology now: Homology and developmental con-
straints explain evolvability. Biology and Philosophy, 22(5), 709–725.
Briggs, D. E. G., & Fortey, R. A. (2005). Wonderful strife: Systematics, stem
groups, and the phylogenetic signal of the Cambrian radiation. Paleobi-
ology, 31(2), 94–112.
Brysse, K. (2008). Fromweirdwonders to stem lineages: The second reclas-
sification of the Burgess Shale fauna. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedi-
cal Sciences, 39(3), 298–313.
Budd, G. E. (1999). Does evolution in body patterning genes drive morpho-
logical change—or vice versa? BioEssays, 21, 326–332.
Budd, G. E. (2001). Climbing life's tree.Nature, 412(6846), 487.
Budd,G. E. (2006).On the origin and evolution ofmajormorphological char-
acters. Biological Reviews, 81(4), 609–628.
Budd,G. E. (2013). At theorigin of animals: The revolutionaryCambrian fos-
sil record. Current Genomics, 14(6), 344–354.
Budd, G. E., & Jensen, S. (2000). A critical reappraisal of the fossil record of
the bilaterian phyla. Biological Reviews, 75(2), 253–295.
Collins, A. G., & Valentine, J. W. (2001). Defining phyla: Evolutionary path-
ways tometazoanbodyplans.Evolution andDevelopment,3(6), 432–442.
Davidson, E. H., & Erwin, D. H. (2006). Gene regulatory networks and the
evolution of animal body plans. Science, 311(5762), 796–800.
DiTeresi, C. A. (2010). Taming variation: Typological thinking and scientific
practice in developmental biology. Doctoral dissertation. University of
Chicago.
Dobzhansky, T. (1937).Genetics and the origin of species. NewYork:Columbia
University Press.
Dubois, A. (2005). Proposed rules for the incorporation of nomina of higher-
ranked zoological taxa in the International Code of Zoological Nomencla-
ture. Zoosystema, 27(2), 365–426.
Erwin, D. H. (2007). Disparity: Morphological pattern and developmental
context. Paleontology, 50(1), 57–73.
Erwin, D. H., & Valentine, J. W. (2013). The Cambrian explosion: The recon-
struction of animal biodiversity. Greenwood Village, CO: Roberts & Co.
Erwin, D. H., Valentine, J.W., & Sepkoski Jr, J. J. (1987). A comparative study
of diversification events: The early Paleozoic versus the Mesozoic. Evo-
lution, 41, 1177–1186.
Fitch, D. H. A., & Sudhaus, W. (2002). One small step for worms, one giant
leap for “Bauplan?” Evolution and Development, 4(4), 243–246.
Foote,M. (1997). The evolution ofmorphological diversity.Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics, 28(1), 129–152.
Freeman, G. (2014). Phyla, phylogeny, and embryonic body plans. In A.
C. Love (Ed.), Conceptual Change in Biology: Scientific and Philosophical
Perspectives on Evolution and Development (pp. 221–241). Dordrecht:
Springer Netherlands.
Gellon, G., & McGinnis, W. (1998). Shaping animal body plans in develop-
ment and evolution by modulation of Hox expression patterns. BioEs-
says, 20(2), 116–125.
Goldschmidt, R. (1952). Evolution, as viewedbyonegeneticist.American Sci-
entist, 40(1), 84–135.
Hejnol, A., & Dunn, C. W. (2016). Animal evolution: Are phyla real? Current
Biology, 26(10), R424–R426.
Hennig,W. (1969).Die Stammesgeschichte der Insekten. Frankfurt:Waldemar
Kramer.
Jefferies, R. P. S. (1979). The origin of chordates: Amethodological essay. In
M. R. House (Ed.), The Origin of Major Invertebrate Groups (pp. 443–477).
London: Academic Press.
Jenner, R. A. (2006). Unburdening evo-devo: Ancestral attractions, model
organisms, and basal baloney.Development, Genes, and Evolution,216(7),
385–394.
Kemp, T. S. (2015). The origin of higher taxa. Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press.
Kinsey, A. C. (1936). The origin of higher categories in cynips. Bloomington, ID:
Indiana University Publications.
Levin, M. et al. (2016). The mid-developmental transition and the evolution
of animal body plans.Nature, 531(7596), 637–641.
Levit, G. S., &Meister, K. (2006). The history of essentialism vs. ErnstMayr's
“EssentialismStory”:A case studyofGerman idealisticmorphology.The-
ory in Biosciences, 124(3), 281–307.
Love, A. C. (2009). Typology reconfigured: From the metaphysics of essen-
tialism to the epistemology of representation. Acta Biotheoretica, 51,
51–75.
Mayr, E. (1959). Darwin and the evolutionary theory in biology. In B. J.Meg-
gers (Ed.), Evolution and Anthropology: A Centennial Appraisal (pp. 1–8).
New York: Theo Gaus’ Sons, Inc.
Mayr, E. (1982). The growth of biological thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Nelson, G. (2016). What we all learned from Hennig. In D. Williams, M.
Schmitt, & Q. D. Wheeler (Eds.), The Future of Phylogenetic Systematics
(pp. 200–212). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Raff, R. A. (1996). The shape of life: Genes, development, and the evolution of
animal form. London: The University of Chicago Press.
Rieppel, O. (2008). Development, essentialism, and population thinking: A
review of Evolving Pathways—Key Themes in Evolutionary Develop-
mental Biology, edited by Alessandro Minelli and Giuseppe Fusco. Evo-
lution and Development, 10(4), 504–507.
Scholtz, G. (2004). Baupläne versus ground patterns, phyla versus mono-
phyla: Aspects of patterns and processes in evolutionary developmen-
tal biology. InG. Scholtz (Ed.), Evolutionary Developmental Biology of Crus-
tacea (pp. 1–14). Exton, PA: A.A. Balkema Publishers.
Simpson, G. G. (1937a). Patterns of phyletic evolution. Bulletin of the Geolog-
ical Society of America, 48, 303–314.
Simpson, G. G. (1937b). Supra-specific variation in nature and in classi-
fication from the view-point of paleontology. The American Naturalist,
71(734), 236–267.
Simpson,G.G. (1937c).Notes on theClark Fork,Upper Paleocene, fauna. Ameri-
canMuseumnovitates; no. 954. NewYork: TheAmericanMuseumofNat-
ural History.
Simpson, G. G. (1937d). The Fort Union of the Crazy Mountain Field, Mon-
tana, and itsMammalian Faunas.Washington, DC: United States Printing
Office.
Simpson, G. G. (1940). Types in modern taxonomy. American Journal of Sci-
ence, 238(6), 413–431
Simpson, G. G. (1941). The role of the individual in evolution. Journal of the
Washington Academy of Sciences, 31(1), 1–20.
Simpson, G. G. (1943). Criteria for genera, species and subspecies in zool-
ogy and paleozoology. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 44(2),
145–178.
WITTEVEEN 131
Simpson, G. G. (1945). The principles of classification and a classification of
mammals. New York: AmericanMuseum of Natural History.
Simpson, G. G. (1951). The species concept. Evolution, 5(4), 285–298.
Simpson, G. G. (1953). The major features of evolution. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Simpson, G. G. (1961). Principles of animal taxonomy. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Simpson, G. G. (1978). Concession to the improbable: An unconventional auto-
biography. NewHaven: Yale University Press.
Simpson, G. G. (1981).Why and how: Some problems and methods in historical
biology. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Simpson,G.G., &Roe, A. (1939).Quantitative zoology: Numerical concepts and
methods in the study of recent and fossil animals. New York:McGraw-Hill.
Telford, M. J., Budd, G.E., & Philippe, H. (2015). Phylogenomic insights into
animal evolution. Current Biology, 25(19), R876–R887.
Valentine, J. W. (1994). Late Precambrian bilateralness: Grades and clades.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 91(15), 6751–6757.
Valentine, J.W. (1995).Why no newphyla after theCambrian?Genome and
ecospace hypotheses revisited. Palaios, 10(2), 190–194.
Valentine, J. W. (2004). On the origin of phyla. Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press.
Wagner,G. P. (2014).Homology, genes, and evolutionary innovation. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
West-Eberhard, M. J. (2003). Developmental plasticity and evolution. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Wilkins, J. S. (2009). Species: A history of the idea. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
Willis, J. C. (1940). The course of evolution by differentiation or divergent muta-
tion rather than by selection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Winsor,M. P. (2003).Non-essentialistmethods in pre-Darwinian taxonomy.
Biology and Philosophy, 18(3), 387–400.
Winsor, M. P. (2006). The creation of the essentialism story: An exercise in
metahistory.History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 28(2), 149–174.
Witteveen, J. (2015). “A temporary oversimplification”: Mayr, Simpson,
Dobzhansky, and theorigins of the typology/populationdichotomy (part
1 of 2). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 54, 20–
33.
Witteveen, J. (2016a). “A temporary oversimplification”: Mayr, Simpson,
Dobzhansky, and theorigins of the typology/populationdichotomy (part
2 of 2). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 57, 96–
105.
Witteveen, J. (2016b). Suppressing synonymy with a homonym: The emer-
gence of the nomenclatural type concept in nineteenth century natural
history. Journal of the History of Biology, 49(1), 135–189.
Wray, G. A., & Strathmann, R. R. (2002). Stasis, change, and functional con-
straint in the evolution of animal body plans, whatever they may be. Vie
et milieu, 52(4), 189–200.
How to cite this article: Witteveen J. Typological thinking:
Then and now. J Exp Zool (Mol Dev Evol). 2018;330:123–131.
https://doi.org/10.1002/jez.b.22796
